Controlling the budgetmaximizing bureaucrat: The validity of Niskanen at 50 years of his legacy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/GP2-5CBMC10005Keywords:
Bureaucracy, Budget, Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat, NiskanenAbstract
2021 marks the 50th anniversary of the publication of the book “Bureaucracy and Representative Government” by William A. Niskanen. One of the central ideas of Niskanen's work is the "budget maximizing bureaucrat." How much validity do Niskanen's postulates about the "budget maximizing bureaucrat" maintain 50 years after its formulation? When observing the budgetary controls that are applied to public managers in Chile today, is it possible to state that they start from the premise that they are “budget-maximizing bureaucrats”? The hypothesis of the "budget maximizing bureaucrat" has various objections, both from a theoretical and empirical point of view, however, when observing the various controls available to the use of budget resources, these seem to be based on a budget "maximizing" assumption. by managers and officials. This makes Niskanen's approach, discussed, revised and corrected, still valid.
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