The Role of Science in Public Debate: Scientific Objectivity from the Model of Deep Disagreements
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/CF40-8PCAY10008Keywords:
deep disagreements, science, public debate, objectivity, incommensurabilityAbstract
in the deep disagreements characterized by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005), the parties involved lack a sufficient common framework for genuine argumentative exchange to occur. While arguments are present as propositional structures, they fail to develop as meaningful activity. Certain public debates, particularly those that appeal to resolution through scientific knowledge, can be understood through the lens of this model. Can evidence derived from scientific knowledge be constructed in such a way as to build, at least partially, this necessary common framework? Which notion of objectivity is most adequate for this purpose? Fogelin's proposal serves as a starting point for reflecting on the resolution of disagreements and scientific knowledge, particularly through the notions of incommensurability and objectivity. It is argued that objectivity in scientific activity—resulting from conditions that enable the negotiation of meanings—can function to resolve some deep disagreements.
n the deep disagreements characterized by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005), the parties involved lack a sufficient common framework for genuine argumentative exchange to occur. While arguments are present as propositional structures, they fail to develop as meaningful activity. Certain public debates, particularly those that appeal to resolution through scientific knowledge, can be understood through the lens of this model. Can evidence derived from scientific knowledge be constructed in such a way as to build, at least partially, this necessary common framework? Which notion of objectivity is most adequate for this purpose? Fogelin's proposal serves as a starting point for reflecting on the resolution of disagreements and scientific knowledge, particularly through the notions of incommensurability and objectivity. It is argued that objectivity in scientific activity—resulting from conditions that enable the negotiation of meanings—can function to resolve some deep disagreements.
In the deep disagreements characterized by Robert Fogelin (1985/2005), the parties involved lack a sufficient common framework for genuine argumentative exchange to occur. While arguments are present as propositional structures, they fail to develop as meaningful activity. Certain public debates, particularly those that appeal to resolution through scientific knowledge, can be understood through the lens of this model. Can evidence derived from scientific knowledge be constructed in such a way as to build, at least partially, this necessary common framework? Which notion of objectivity is most adequate for this purpose? Fogelin's proposal serves as a starting point for reflecting on the resolution of disagreements and scientific knowledge, particularly through the notions of incommensurability and objectivity. It is argued that objectivity in scientific activity—resulting from conditions that enable the negotiation of meanings—can function to resolve some deep disagreements.Downloads
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