Cuadernos de Filosofía

COLOCATIONISM, PLENITUDINISM AND FISSION

Marta Campdelacreu — 2025-05-01

One of the main challenges facing colocationism is the grounding problem. Many colocationist solutions to this problem include a primitive component. However, primitivist solutions to the problem differ in their acceptance of plenitudinism, which, according to Bennett, is essential for the viability of primitivist solutions. In this paper, I will analyse the role of plenitudinism in a primitivist solution to the grounding problem. I will then argue that the solutions to the grounding problem proposed by primitivism and plenitudinous primitivism are, in fact, subject to the same criticism and are, therefore, equally unsatisfactory.

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS

2025-05-01

This paper discusses which is the most appropriate formulation of the problem of universals. I present my discussion by contrasting it with the proposal on this topic put forward by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2000), and I claim that, even if his attempt at formulating the problem by taking into account Nozick’s (1981) general discussion of philosophical problems is illuminating, his proposal to the effect that the problem of universals would be solved by offering the truthmakers of statements expressing simple singular predications (instances of what he calls the “many over one”) is inadequately grounded. Towards the end of the paper I defend the idea that, in keeping with a more traditional take on the problem, what it actually demands is ontological assays of instances of the so-called “one over many”.

THE GROUNDING PROBLEMS FOR ARISTOTELIANISM

José Tomás Alvarado Marambio — 2025-05-01

Aristotelianism is understood here as the position according to which: (i) there are universals and thin particulars that instantiate those universals, and (ii) necessarily universals should be instantiated in some object or objects, and necessarily thin particulars should instantiate some universal. Universals have a general grounding profile. Aristotelian universals, as well as Aristotelian thin particulars, have also special grounding profiles. It is argued here that the conjunction of the general grounding profile for universals and the especial Aristotelian grounding profiles generates at least three cycles of ontological priority that put into question the coherence of Aristotelianism.

THE NATURE OF MODAL FACTS

Pablo Rychter — 2025-05-01

This paper explores the nature of modal facts, such as the fact that Socrates might not have been a philosopher or that Socrates is necessarily human. First, we provide a characterization of such facts from a metaphysical standpoint, avoiding a purely linguistic approach. Second, we present a classification and discussion of various contemporary theories concerning the nature and grounding of modal facts. Finally, we offer a positive, though provisional, assessment of the “subjectivist” view that modal facts are grounded in facts about linguistic and conceptual practices.

BEYOND OBJECTS: ONTIC STRUCTURAL REALISM AND MODAL-HAMILTONIAN INTERPRETATION FACING THE PROBLEM OF QUANTUM INDISTINGUISHABILITY

Bruno Borge — 2025-05-01

One of the major appeals of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) is to provide a metaphysical proposal capable of dealing with the ontological problem of quantum indistinguishability. The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation of quantum mechanics (MHI), on the other hand, aspires to formulate a “global” solution, in which all the ontological problems of the theory can be adequately addressed in terms of a single ontology. In both proposals, the ontological category of object is absent. The purpose of the present article is to analyze the MHI ontology by suggesting that it satisfies the central motivations that led to the formulation of OSR but also overcomes the conceptual problems that OSR has faced since its formulation.

AN OBJECT IN ANOTHER

Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia — 2025-05-01

I offer a novel diagnosis of the equivocation arguments against the hypotheses that spots, holes, or pains are objects. In my diagnosis, the reason why the relevant arguments are invalid is because spatial relations do not transmit all spatial properties. This means we can explain why these arguments are not valid without having to conclude that holes, stains and pains are not objects, but properties.

EXTERNALISM, SOCIAL NORMS, AND EXPERTISE: AN ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME SOME PROBLEMS IN CHARLOTTE WITT’S SOCIAL GOODNESS

José Giromini — 2025-05-01

The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, to present a critical exam of the externalist perspective that Charlotte Witt puts forward in Social Goodness (2023) in order to answer two important questions in contemporary social ontology: the ontological question of the bindigness of social norms and the question, that Witt ties to the notion of expertise, of the different attitudes that individuals can adopt towards those norms. On the other hand, to offer, after diagnosing certain important insufficiencies in Witt’s perspective, an alternative externalist framework (historical pragmatism), that accounts for both the institution of social norms, and the attitudes that different experts can adopt towards those norms, by situating them in the context of historical processes.

LA METAPHYSICAL INDETERMINACY AS DETERMINABILITY: THE CASE OF THE CYRENAICS

Bruno Borge — 2025-05-01

This work applies Jessica Wilson’s metaphysical indeterminacy approach, based on the determinable-determinate distinction, to ancient ontologies, focusing on the Cyrenaic school. It argues that this conceptual framework elucidates the nature of indeterminacy in Cyrenaic metaphysics, complementing and resolving tensions in Ugo Zillioli’s interpretation. The study reviews the contemporary debate on metaphysical indeterminacy, presents Wilson’s approach and its applications, and applies it to ancient ontologies, particularly the Cyrenaic school. It discusses the conceptual and interpretative advantages of this application, contributing to a deeper understanding of Cyrenaic metaphysics within the context of indeterminacy ontologies in ancient philosophy.

IBEROAMÉRICA Y LA METAFÍSICA ANALÍTICA

Esteban Ortiz Medina — 2025-04-30