Metaphilosophical Consequences of Philosophical Deep Disagreements

Abstract

This article examines the metaphilosophical implications of deep disagreements in philosophy. We argue that such disagreements—rooted in fundamental divergences in methodological, epistemological, or metaphysical commitments—challenge the very practice of philosophy by undermining the possibility of rationally adjudicating between competing philosophical theories. This renders the traditional exchange of reasons in support of one theory over another ultimately futile. To address this challenge, we propose that philosophical argumentation ought to be reconceived as an end in itself rather than as a means to achieve rational resolution. To develop this thesis, we first outline two influential accounts of deep disagreement more generally. We then introduce a distinction between intraphilosophical and interphilosophical disagreements, where the former occurs among epistemic peers within shared frameworks, while the latter represents deep, framework-level divides. Subsequently, we analyze the structure of deep philosophical disagreements and demonstrate how both epistemic and practical reasons fail to provide adequate rational responses. Finally, we address two key objections concerning the persistence of argumentative language in philosophical debates and the alleged impossibility of philosophical progress.