Deep Disagreement: Untangling the Skein
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/CF40-3DPDC10003Keywords:
deep disagreement, Robert Fogelin, argumentation, practical philosophy, pluralismAbstract
This article presents a response to the problem of deep disagreements as developed by Robert Fogelin (1985). According to this author, there are disagreements that cannot be rationally resolved because they concern "framework propositions". I argue that, with certain distinctions in place, Fogelin's conclusion is less severe than initially thought. The first distinction is between resolving and overcoming disagreements. From the fact that disagreements cannot be resolved, it does not follow that they cannot be overcome in other ways. Thus, in addition to resolution, parties can overcome disagreements through means such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or suspension of judgment. The second distinction is between theoretical and practical disagreements. I argue that while for theoretical disagreements the impossibility of resolution implies that the only way to overcome them is through suspension of judgment, for practical disagreements it is not possible to suspend judgment, but there are other ways to "manage the disagreement". With these distinctions made, I conclude by noting that the fact that certain disagreements are deep does not prevent their overcoming, which reflects a pluralistic view of argumentation that should be studied in greater depth.
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