**Wittgenstein and Moral Disagreements: On Moral Justification and Its Implications for Moral Relativism**
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https://doi.org/10.29393/CF40-2WDJF10002Keywords:
Wittgenstein, moral disagreements, moral justification, moral reasons, moral relativism, philosophy of language.Abstract
This article examines Wittgenstein's later observations on moral disagreements. First, it analyzes practices of justification and reason-giving in moral disputes. It argues that, for Wittgenstein, moral reasons function as descriptions used to justify moral evaluations. Second, it explains that the adequacy and conclusiveness of moral reasons and justifications depend on their appeal to those to whom they are presented, rather than on how the world objectively is. Third, it demonstrates that Wittgenstein's observations about the inconclusive nature of moral reasons and justifications do not imply a commitment to moral relativism. Finally, it suggests how Wittgenstein's insights may be utilized in future research to develop a new framework for understanding deep moral disagreements.
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