Wittgenstein y los desacuerdos morales: sobre la justificación moral y sus implicaciones para el relativismo moral
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https://doi.org/10.29393/CF40-2WDJF10002Palavras-chave:
Wittgenstein, Desacuerdos morales, Justificación, Relativismo moralResumo
Este artículo estudia las observaciones tardías de Wittgenstein sobre los desacuerdos morales. Primero, examina las prácticas de justificación y dar razones en los desacuerdos morales. Argumenta que, para Wittgenstein, las razones morales son descripciones que se utilizan para justificar una evaluación moral. Segundo, explica que la idoneidad y el carácter concluyente de las razones y justificaciones morales dependen de su atractivo para quienquiera que se presenten, no de cómo es el mundo. Tercero, muestra que las observaciones de Wittgenstein sobre el carácter inconcluyente de las razones y justificaciones morales no implican un compromiso con el relativismo moral. Finalmente, muestra como las observaciones de Wittgenstein pueden usarse en futuras investigaciones para desarrollar una nueva imagen de los desacuerdos morales profundos.
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