Untranslatability, and Intensionality: A Discussion Between Thomas Kuhn and Donald Davidson
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https://doi.org/10.29393/CF38-4ARII10004Keywords:
Incommensurability, Untranslatability, Intensionality, Interpretation, Thomas Kuhn, Donald DavidsonAbstract
In this paper, Kuhn’s two argumentative strategies for defending incommensurability are analyzed. These strategies are, on one hand, the strong separation between interpretation and translation, and, on the other hand, the Kuhn’s claim for taking into account the intensional aspects of translation. It is argued that both strategies rest on methodological mistakes in the process of radical interpretation. Hence,
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