Externalism, Social Norms, and Expertise: an attempt to overcome some problems in Charlotte Witt’s Social Goodness
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/CF42-7NSGM20007Keywords:
Social Ontology, Normativity, Pragmatism, Know-how, HistoryAbstract
The aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand, to present a critical exam of the externalist perspective that Charlotte Witt puts forward in Social Goodness (2023) in order to answer two important questions in contemporary social ontology: the ontological question of the bindigness of social norms and the question, that Witt ties to the notion of expertise, of the different attitudes that individuals can adopt towards those norms. On the other hand, to offer, after diagnosing certain important insufficiencies in Witt’s perspective, an alternative externalist framework (historical pragmatism), that accounts for both the institution of social norms, and the attitudes that different experts can adopt towards those norms, by situating them in the context of historical processes.
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