The nature of modal facts
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/CF42-4RYNH10004Keywords:
Modality, Necessity, Possibility, Essence, GroundingAbstract
This paper explores the nature of modal facts, such as the fact that Socrates might not have been a philosopher or that Socrates is necessarily human. First, we provide a characterization of such facts from a metaphysical standpoint, avoiding a purely linguistic approach. Second, we present a classification and discussion of various contemporary theories concerning the nature and grounding of modal facts. Finally, we offer a positive, though provisional, assessment of the “subjectivist” view that modal facts are grounded in facts about linguistic and conceptual practices.
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