Recovering a Kuhnian Program in History of Science
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/CF38-3LMRP20003Keywords:
Thomas Kuhn, History of Science, Thalheimer Conferences, Anti-presentism, Kuhnian InternalismAbstract
In this work we will analyze Thomas Kuhn’s proposal of historiographic program. We will show that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, being the most
read and commented work of the author, presented failures because of which great efforts of posterior refinement were needed. This refining job was done
in the rest of Kuhn’s work, but it was registered mostly asystematically. However, we will show that the previously unpublished and recently recovered and translated to Spanish text Scientific Development and Lexical Change is a synthetic and systematic primary source that summarizes his program in its most refined version, after reinforcing his position against the critics done to The Structure.
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