Beyond objects: ontic structural realism and modal-Hamiltonian interpretation facing the problem of quantum indistinguishability
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https://doi.org/10.29393/CF42-5EOBO20005Keywords:
Ontic structural realism, Modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, Quantum indistinguishabilityAbstract
One of the major appeals of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) is to provide a metaphysical proposal capable of dealing with the ontological problem of quantum indistinguishability. The Modal-Hamiltonian Interpretation of quantum mechanics (MHI), on the other hand, aspires to formulate a “global” solution, in which all the ontological problems of the theory can be adequately addressed in terms of a single ontology. In both proposals, the ontological category of object is absent. The purpose of the present article is to analyze the MHI ontology by suggesting that it satisfies the central motivations that led to the formulation of OSR but also overcomes the conceptual problems that OSR has faced since its formulation.
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