Epistemic Coherence and Justification: A Critical Review of the Goldmanian Objection to Ernest Sosa's Virtue Perspectivism
Keywords:
justification, intellectual virtue, coherence, animal knowledge, reflective knowledge, virtue perspectivismAbstract
In this article, I analyze some of the critical observations that Alvin Goldman elaborates against what is known in Ernesto Sosa's epistemology as Virtue Perspectivism. To do this, I first outline some of the fundamental notions of Sosa's epistemology and its connections to Goldman's theory; I then present the latter's rejection of the role Sosa assigns to coherence in epistemic justification. Based on this, I intend to demonstrate that Goldman's evaluation fails because it manifests an incomplete understanding of the core proposal of Sosa's theory.
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