Desacuerdos profundos: operacionalización relacional del concepto y conexión con el aumento de la polarización
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/CF40-10DPAV20010Palabras clave:
desacuerdo profundo, desacuerdo cruzado, desacuerdo cuidado, polarización, giro político en filosofía analíticaResumen
En este artículo nos preguntamos qué son los desacuerdos profundos y cuál es su conexión con el aumento de la polarización. En contraposición con la mayor parte de los análisis de la noción de desacuerdo profundo ofrecidos hasta ahora, nos centramos en la dimensión empírica de la noción ofreciendo una operacionalización relacional del fenómeno: proponemos abordar los desacuerdos profundos pensando en los indicadores que permitan su detección, y pensamos que este proceso solo puede llevarse a cabo por oposición a los rasgos de otros tipos de desacuerdo. Esta propuesta se enmarca dentro del giro político en filosofía analítica. En concreto, defendemos que la caracterización de los desacuerdos profundos debe evaluarse teniendo en cuenta su capacidad para ayudarnos a detectar e intervenir sobre las injusticias relacionadas con el fenómeno. En línea con este propósito práctico –independiente de, y compatible con, otras propuestas teóricas–, discutimos brevemente nuestra aproximación a la noción y una manera de cuidar nuestros desacuerdos.
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