Los problemas de fundación para el aristotelismo
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https://doi.org/10.29393/CF42-3PAAM10003Palabras clave:
Universales, Particulares delgados, Universales aristotélicos, Universales platónicosResumen
El aristotelismo se entiende aquí como la posición según la cual: (i) hay universales y particulares delgados que instancian esos universales, y (ii) necesariamente los universales deben ser instanciados en algún objeto u objetos, y necesariamente los particulares delgados deben instanciar algún universal. Los universales tienen un perfil de fundación general. Los universales aristotélicos, así como los particulares delgados aristotélicos, también tienen perfiles de fundación especiales. Se argumenta aquí que la conjunción del perfil de fundamentación general para los universales y los perfiles de fundación aristotélicos especiales genera al menos tres ciclos de prioridad ontológica que ponen en cuestión la coherencia del aristotelismo.
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