Reform without Revolution: Is there any possibility of normative change within the kantian framework of the republican ideal as governmental Form?

Abstract

In contemporary debates about republicanism Kant’s republican political theory is normally neglected, in part because in it the notion of sovereignty is too much emphasized and in part because Kant is held to be a liberal thinker. However, I shall contend in this paper that Kant's rejection of a “right to Revolution” –rejection that is uncomfortable for liberals, since includes pacific civil disobedience too– could be made coherent with his political theory only if we look at it with his notion of republicanism in mind. For Kant, republicanism has two particular features: first, the subjection of citizens and the State to the law –a Law that they imposed on themselves–, and second, that the self–government of the people should be exercised only through representatives and never directly. Both are conditions of political freedom, according to Kant. The despotic regime infringes both conditions; Revolution, on the contrary,  challenges State and Law altogether. But for Kant only in the frame formed by State and Law is political freedom possible.