Una Towards a Rational Resolution of Deep Disagreements: Limits and Possibilities
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.29393/CF40-4DPMG10004Keywords:
deep disagreements, epistemology of disagreement, rationality, Duncan Pritchard, conflict resolutionAbstract
This article has three aims. The first and primary one is to show that certain deep disagreements are rationally resolvable. The procedure for the rational resolution of these disagreements aligns with how Duncan Pritchard (2011, 2021) argues that any deep disagreement can be resolved. Thus, the second aim of this article is to provide reasons for thinking, against Pritchard, that this procedure is only applicable to a specific class of deep disagreements. The third aim, treated as subsidiary to the first, is to defend the characterization of deep disagreements employed here against two alternative characterizations.
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